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The tragic case of conjoined twins Mary and Jodie made news around the 
world and sent ethicists into speculation. Born in Manchester, England on 
August 8, 2000, Mary and Jodie's appearance was so unusual and their 
disabilities so severe that several doctors had to excuse themselves from 
giving care to the twins. Jodie and Mary were joined at the lower abdomen 
and shared a spine. Though both twins had nearly a full complement of 
organs, Jodie's heart and lungs maintained both of their lives since Mary's 
were not sufficiently developed to pump oxygenated blood. Doctors 
predicted that Jodie's circulatory system would give out in a matter of 
weeks under the strain of supporting both girls. 
It was a decision to rival Solomon's: Should one twin be sacrificed in 
order to save the other or should both be allowed to perish? In light of 
medical testimony, a British high court judge ordered that the twins be 
separated against the wishes of their Catholic parents and the Catholic 
archbishop of Westminster, Cormac Murphy-O'Connor, who objected to 
the procedure for a variety of reasons in a tightly argued submission to the 
court. On November 7, 2000, surgeons in St. Mary's Hospital, following 
the judge's ruling, separated the twins and Mary died. 
The case raises profound ethical and, indeed, metaphysical 
questions. Obviously, not all these issues can be addressed here. I will limit 
myself to these three questions: 
1) Was the separation of Mary and Jodie intentional killing? 
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2) Was the separation of Mary and Jodie intentional mutilation? 
and 
3) Was the separation of Mary and Jodie obligatory? 
Answers to these questions led Murphy-O'Connor to the judgment 
that the twins must not be separated. Different answers to the same 
questions led Lord Justice Ward of the appeals court to the judgment that 
the twins must be separated. My answers to these questions have led to the 
conclusion that Jodie and Mary may be licitly separated but that there is no 
obligation to separate them. 
1. Was the Separation of Mary and Jodie Intentional Killing? 
Some have argued that separating conjoined twins violates the 
principle that human life is sacred, that it is inviolable, so that no one 
should ever intend to cause an innocent person's death by act or omission. 
David C. Thomasma, et al. note arguments that construe the separation of 
conjoined twins as killing one to save another. "(T)he double effect 
doctrine includes a strong proviso that the 'evil' effect cannot be the means 
of achieving the good one, since we cannot condone an evil means to 
accomplish a good end (the ends do not justify the means). Under this 
principle, directly killing one twin is a bad effect and cannot be used as the 
means to accomplish the good effect, a chance for the other one to live."l 
However, in the case of Jodie and Mary, as with the Lakeburg twins,2 
it is not the death of one twin that secures the life of the other, even though 
in both cases the surgeons themselves did not seem to view the death of the 
weaker twin in negative terms. Suppose that the twins were separated and 
the weaker twin received donated organs that secured her life. The fact that 
the weaker twin did not die would not in any way hinder (or help) the 
survival of the stronger. It is not the death of the weaker twin that is the 
means of survival for the stronger twin, any more than the death of the 
fetus is the means of securing the life of the mother in the case of a gravid 
cancerous uterus. In both cases, the death is not a means but rather is a 
foreseen side effect. 
However, some philosophers have argued that if a side effect is fully 
foreseen or even if it is only highly likely, then it must also be included in 
the means as intended.3 This view, however, cannot be held by those who 
have long treated the removal of a cancerous uterus gravid with a previable 
fetus as the paradigm case of foreseeing, rather than intending an evil 
effect, since in this case the death of the fetus is inevitable. Since one 
160 Linacre Quarterly 
desires what one intends, this view would also lead to the implausible 
conclusion that doctors desire all the harmful foreseen side effects of the 
medications, surgeries, and treatments that they prescribe.4 
Thomas D. Kennedy proposes another standard for distinguishing 
what is intended from what is merely foreseen. Following many authors, he 
suggests that in the removal of an ectopic pregnancy the embryonic death, 
though certain and fully foreseen, is nevertheless not intended. However, he 
believes that the case of Mary and Jodie differs significantly. Kennedy writes: 
In the case of ectopic pregnancy, the death of the fetus does 
not save the life of her mother. We could imagine a removal 
of the fallopian tube in which the fetus lives and the 
immediate transfer of the fetus to an artificial womb in 
which the baby might develop through "birth." Unlikely, 
indeed, but possible. It is not unreasonable, thus, to consider 
the death of the fetus an undesirable effect, rather than the 
means to the mother's preservation in the removal of the 
fallopian tubes. We cannot think of the removal of Mary 
analogously. Mary has no functioning heart or lungs. To 
surgically separate the twins is, thus, to separate Mary from 
the function of vital organs. We cannot imagine a human 
being living without vital organs. Thus, to aim at the 
separation of Mary from her vital organs is to aim at her 
death, to intend that she die so that her sister may live.s 
Just as separating someone from food and water is intending to kill them, 
so too, argues Kennedy, is separating someone from the function of vital 
organs. 
About the case of ectopic pregnancy, Kennedy is absolutely correct. 
Not only is it possible to conceive of the fetus being removed and surviving 
initial implantation outside the uterus, in fact there are several documented 
cases of healthy children born from such a transplantation from a fallopian 
tube. 7 Clearly, removing an ectopic pregnancy from a fallopian tube is not 
necessarily intentional killing. 
However, Kennedy seems to be mistaken that one cannot imagine a 
human being living without vital organs. Unlike, say a married bachelor, or 
a square circle, a human being living without vital organs is certainly a 
logical possibility. Imagine a person living without vital organs through 
divine intervention. In fact , one might argue that a human embryo at an 
early stage of development is a living human being but lacking any vital 
organs. In addition, separating someone from his or her vital organs does 
not in fact always result in death. Mary, for instance, was living without her 
vital organs, using instead Jodie's. Similarly, those who use kidney dialysis 
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machines, iron lungs, respirators, colostomies, etc., all survive without 
vital organs. Separating a person from vital organs cannot in itself be 
considered killing, without casting doubt on the morallicitness of artificial 
heart transplants. Finally, comparing the separated conjoined twins to the 
removal of food and water from a person would seem to strengthen the 
case against considering the separation as intentional killing. Kennedy 
writes: "As surely as refusing me access to food and water is to aim at my 
death, so surely is removing Mary from the vital organs she shares with 
Jodie to aim at her death."7 However, were I to remove all food and water 
from myself on a hunger strike, few would consider my actions suicidal. If 
a family in grave danger of starvation were to refuse access to food and 
water to a stranger, they would nevertheless not be intending the stranger's 
death, even if they knew he would die. This suggests that Kennedy has not 
properly distinguished intention from foresight. 
The question of distinguishing intention from foresight is a vexing 
one. What is included in a means to an end? What falls within intention and 
what lies outside intention? This is a complex and delicate question. Let 
me just propose for the sake of argument that the following characteristics 
may help determine what lies within intention and is included in the 
means. An effect is intended if: 
and 
1) The achievement of the effect presents a problem for the agent that 
occasions deliberation. 
2) The achievement of the effect constrains other intentions of the agent. 
3) The agent endeavors to achieve the effect, perhaps being forced to 
return to deliberation if circumstances change 
4) The failure of the agent to realize the effect is a failure in the 
agent's plan.8 
If one were to distinguish intention from foresight in the way 
proposed, then the separation of conjoined twins would not be intentional 
killing, even if one foresaw that one twin should die. In separating Jodie 
and Mary, the achievement of Mary's death does not present a problem for 
the doctors that prompts deliberation. If Mary's death were the goal, there 
would be more efficient ways of achieving the lethal effect that would also 
be less dangerous to Jodie. Secondly, achievement of the effect of Mary's 
death does not constrain the other intentions of the doctors. They would not 
hesitate to follow a given means of separating the children because it risked 
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the possibility of Mary 's living. Thirdly, the doctors do not endeavor to 
achieve the death of Mary nor would they "finish the job" if by some 
miracle Mary survived. Finally, were Mary, per impossible, to survive, the 
original plan of the doctors would have been in no way thwarted. Thus, in 
separating Mary and Jodie, the death of the weaker twin is an unfortunate 
side effect, but not an intended means, of saving the stronger twin. 
2. Was the Separation of Mary and Jodie Intentional Mutilation? 
A second question about the intervention has to do with a person's 
bodily integrity, that arguably should not be invaded when the 
consequences of doing so are of no benefit to that person. This is most 
particularly the case if the consequences are foreseeably lethal. Some have 
argued that in separating Jodie and Mary, doctors violated Mary's bodily 
integrity. As William May wrote: "Thus even if Mary's death were merely 
'foreseen' and 'not intended,' the invasion of her bodily integrity clearly is. 
This consideration seems to me to clinch the matter ... Even if Mary 's 
death were not directly intended, surgery intentionally performed on her 
body, for someone else 's benefit and her harm, clearly is involved."9 In 
other words, though the surgery may not have been intentional killing, it 
was intentional mutilation. Clearly, to harvest one person's organs to save 
another person's life would be wrong. 
Here is where the metaphysical questions begin. Did Jodie and Mary 
share just one human body? Did they have two human bodies? Did they 
have two human bodies with a portion shared? It would seem that they do 
not simply share one human body since a single human body does not have 
four arms, four legs and two heads. 
Even if this implausible description were adopted, "double effect" 
reasoning would be in play where one act has two effects - one positive 
and one negative. However, Lord Justice Ward argued that double effect 
reasoning is not appropriate in this case: "I can readily see how the doctrine 
works when doctors are treating one patient administering pain-killing 
drugs for the sole good of relieving pain, yet appreciating the bad side-
effect that it will hasten the patient's death. I simply fail to see how it can 
apply here where the side-effect to the good cure for Jodie is another 
patient 's, Mary 's, death, and when the treatment cannot have been 
undertaken to effect any benefit for Mary." 10 
Although the Lord Justice is correct that double effect has been often 
used in medical ethics for cases in which the harmful and the helpful 
effects are borne by the same person, the origin of double effect reasoning 
came from lethal self-defense, and its consistent application for hundreds 
of years in cases such as ectopic pregnancy and the gravid cancerous uterus 
has often involved effects that would benefit one person but harm another. 
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Thus, applying this kind of reasoning to conjoined twins is not a departure 
from established uses of double effect. But more on how double effect 
would apply to this situation later. 
Do Jodie and Mary have two distinct human bodies? In some cases 
of conjoined twins, this is clearly the case. Consider conjoined twins by 
linked arms that could be easily separated. It would be fairly easy to 
distinguish clearly between the twins' bodies. William May 's assumption, 
and the Court's, was that Jodie and Mary fall into this category. Where 
Mary 's body ends and Jodie 's starts is clearly distinct and according to 
May, the surgery was on Mary's side of the divide. According to a surgeon 
testifying to the court, however, the division was right in the divide 
between them: 
Separation of the twins would necessarily involve exploration 
of the internal abdominal and pelvic organs of both twins 
and particularly the united bladder. It is expected however 
that each twin would have all its own body structure and 
organs. It is not anticipated or expected to take any structure 
or organ from either twin to donate to the other .... 
Interruption of the blood supply from Jodie supporting 
Mary would occur at the level of the united sacrococcygeal 
vertebrae. This site could be biased towards Jodie. 11 
On this analysis, it would seem that no mutilation is taking place. The body 
cavity of both girls is explored and then Mary 's body is separated from 
Jodie 's. This exploration and separation is for Jodie's sake and not Mary 's, 
but the same is true in cases of organ donation. 
However, a third possibility would be that Jodie and Mary had two 
distinct bodies with a shared portion. One could clearly distinguish Jodie's 
head from Mary 's, Jodie 's arms from Mary 's arms, and yet they shared a 
torso, aorta, bladder, and spinal cord. Even if one accepts the surgeon 's 
description of the proposed separation, clearly there is some shared portion 
where Mary 's half touches Jodie's. The surgery was performed on this 
shared portion, and not merely on Mary. Would then it be permissible to 
"invade" the shared portion? 
Consider sisters who jointly owned some real estate where selling 
the land would benefit one, but harm the other. Presumably, the sale would 
go through only if both agreed to it. But let us say that the shared property 
was a life preserver, and the situation was the sinking Titanic . They could 
share the life preserver and both surely die. Or perhaps they would agree 
that whoever has the greater chance at life should take the life preserver. It 
is plausible to suggest that the more fragile sister, if she were generous or 
even if she were just sensible, would let the sister with the greater chance at 
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life have the life preserver. Indeed, few would blame and most would pity 
the stronger sister if she simply took the life preserver from the weaker in a 
desperate act of self-defense. The life preserver, after all, also belonged to 
the stronger sister and both weaker and stronger would soon no longer be 
able to use it. Imagine, however, that the life preserver clearly belonged to 
the stronger sister with the weaker sister holding on to the jointly owned 
strap of the life preserver. The case for the weaker deferring to the stronger 
becomes even greater. This situation is analogous to Mary and Jodie 
because the heart and lungs that were preserving life belonged to Jodie, 
though they did have in common a shared portion. 
Even though a portion in common is shared, the question is not 
simply of benefiting one person and hanning another. The real options are 
benefiting one party and harming another, or harming both parties. One 
might even argue with Lord Justice Brooke that Mary and Jodie both 
receive some benefit from the operation insofar as each receives her 
rightful bodily integrity and physical anatomy through the separation of 
what nature had misjoined together. 12 
Would this reasoning justify the ghastly possibility that a doctor 
might remove the organs of a person with severe head trauma and implant 
them in several waiting subjects? Sacrifice one person to save five others? 
There are several differences between the cases. A person with severe head 
injury may live for years; doctors predicted that the twins would die within 
months. Arguably, they were already in the process of dying. Just as 
foregoing health care resources is permissible, so too for a person in the 
process of dying it would be permissible, indeed heroic, for such a person t 
donate their organs though he or she foresaw (but did not intend!) that this 
would hasten death. Secondly, the organs of the person with a severe head 
injury indisputably "belong" to that person. The heart and lungs in question 
with the conjoined twins perhaps belong to both but it is more accurate to 
describe them as belonging to the stronger twin, Jodie. 
Hence, the case of Mary and Jodie is more like Judith Thompson's 
famous violinist who survives through using another person as a kidney 
dialysis machine. Even if not a good argument for abortion, it does seem 
plausible that a person would not act wrongly ending the connection with 
the violinist. Finally, in the case of harvesting the organs of one person to 
give to others, the person whose organs may be taken does not undermine 
the well being of those who need the organs. 
On the other hand, Mary posed two real threats to Jodie's well being 
in addition to the strain put on Jodie's heart. In the words of Lord Justice 
Brooke: "(P)ersistent hypoxia in Mary might lead to the release of 
cytokines which would be capable of crossing over into Jodie's circulation. 
Such cytokines are known to be damaging to the brain and might lead to 
white matter damage, which in turn might lead to the development of 
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irreversible cerebral palsy. Persistent hypoxia in Mary might also lead to 
the generation of thromboplastins which would enter Jodie 's circulation 
and cause an abnormality in coagulation, causing a prolongation in clotting 
time and a tendency to bleed."13 Clearly, it would be cruel and inaccurate to 
portray the innocent and pitiful Mary as an "aggressor." However, allowing 
blood to flow between them would indeed endanger Jodie 's well being 
unlike the case of taking one living person's organs to save five others. 
The objection that separating Jodie and Mary is intentional 
mutilation might be handled by the principle of double effect or, more 
accurately since more than one principle is involved, double effect 
reasoning. Developing the teaching of Thomas Aquinas on lethal self-
defense, Jean Pierre Gury offered the most influential formulation of the 
conditions of double effect reasoning: 
It is permitted to posit a good or indifferent cause, from 
which a two-fold effect follows, one good, but the other bad, 
if there is present a proportionately grave reason (causa 
proportionate gravis) , the end of the agent is honest, and the 
good effect follows from that [good or indifferent] cause not 
from a mediating bad one.14 
The act done, exploring the body cavity and separating the twins, is 
not intrinsically evil. Clearly there are many cases in which it is 
permissible to separate conjoined twins in which no mutilation or invasion 
of bodily integrity is present. Nor is exploring the body cavity of Mary 
intrinsically evil, for in the case of organ donation the body cavity is 
explored not for the good of the donor but for the good of the receiver. 
The good effect is the cessation of the strain on Jodie 's heart and 
lungs; the bad effect is the cessation of oxygenated blood to Mary. It is not 
the cessation of oxygenated blood to Mary that per se aids Jodie. If Mary's 
heart and lungs had been sufficiently developed, the bad effect would not 
have materialized. In fact, a surgeon involved was asked before the 
operation whether Mary could be kept alive if she were immediately 
hooked up to a heart and lung machine. He answered that artificial support 
of Mary 's life was indeed possible. The surgeons had not considered that 
option because there was "no point" in artificial support of Mary's life in 
light of her gravely disabled condition, the lack of technical feasibility in 
child organ transplants, and the lack of an available heart and lungs to 
transplant for such a small patient. IS 
Thus, in this case, the removal of the evil effect was not only a 
theoretical possibility but also an actual possibility. Thus, the bad effect 
was not the means to the good. Was there a serious reason for allowing the 
evil effect? This is one aspect of the next difficult question: 
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3. Was There an Obligation to Separate Mary and Jodie? 
The classic reason that justifies allowing one person to die is saving 
another. In self-defense, one may preserve innocent life even by means that 
one foresees will take the attacker's life. In the case of a gravid cancerous 
uterus and ectopic pregnancy, defending the life of the mother justifies 
allowing the fetus to die. It would seem that efforts to save Jodie would 
justify the foreseen (but not intended) lethal effect of Mary. If it is justified 
to separate the twins, is it also obligatory? 
An answer to this question must take into account more than just the 
two lives at stake. In preserving life, one must avoid two extremes. On the 
one hand, some would say that without a certain quality of life a person 
should not live. But as Cormac Murphy-O'Connor wrote: 
It is seriously unreasonable to seek to justify the ending of 
someone's life on the grounds that that human being's life 
lacks value or worth, [note omitted] so that he or she would 
be better off dead. Judgments of that kind should not be 
admitted as justifications of intentional killing since they are 
both arbitrary and admit of no principled way of containing 
their extension to a variety of other conditions, and so are 
incompatible with the justice which the law should uphold. 
The indispensable foundation of justice is the basic equality 
in worth of every human being.16 
On the other hand, a "vitalistic" ethic which promotes and preserves 
human life at any and all cost without consideration of other values also 
misses the mark. There is no obligation to preserve human life regardless 
of the burdens on others and the one whose life is preserved. Again, in the 
words of Murphy-O'Connor: 
There is no duty to adopt particular therapeutic measures to 
preserve life when these are likely to impose excessive burdens 
and the patient and the patients' carers. Would the operation 
that is involved in the separation involve such "extraordinary 
means"? If so, then quite apart from its effect on Mary, there 
can be no moral obligation on doctors to carry out the 
operation to save Jodie, or on the parents to consent to it. 17 
Like so many issues, what is to count as "ordinary" as opposed to 
"extraordinary" means is itself the subject of some debate. 
Let me simply propose, though I cannot here defend, a standard. 
William E. May, in his article, "Criteria for Withholding or Withdrawing 
Treatment," writes: 
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(M)edical treatment is "extraordinary" or "disproportionate" 
and hence not morally obligatory if objectively discernible 
features in the treatment itself, its side-effects, and its 
negative consequences impose grave burdens on the person 
being treated or on others. Excessive burdensomeness is the 
major criterion, therefore, for determining whether or not to 
withhold or withdraw medical treatments. Excessive 
burdensomeness is, one could say, the genus. Species of 
excessive burdensomeness include riskiness of the 
treatment, excessive pain of the treatment, the severely 
negative impact the treatment will have on the subject's life, 
treatments judged morally or psychologically repugnant, 
and treatments that would be too costly and severely imperil 
the economic security of the patient, the patient's family, or 
the community. 18 
In the case of conjoined twins, most of these kinds of 
burdensomeness were in play. Although the surgeons said that treatment 
would not be excessively risky for Jodie (they projected a 94% likelihood 
of survival), it was not only risky but also certainly lethal to Mary. And 
even though Jodie is alive at the moment I write, one study suggests that 
there is no case in which one twin was sacrificed and the other twin 
survived more than a year. 19 Although Jodie 's quality of life might be 
reasonably good, doctors fear that Jodie will experience incontinence, 
difficulty in walking, and the need for protracted reconstructive surgery.20 
The treatment was judged morally and psychologically repugnant by the 
parents whose love and care for both children were not questioned but 
assumed by the court. The treatment was costly and severely imperiled the 
economic security of the children 's family. The father of the twins had 
been unemployed for eight years ; the mother stopped working when she 
found out she was pregnant. They foresaw years of expensive treatments 
and disruption to their family if the twins were separated. In fact, they 
predicted that they would have to place Jodie in an adoptive family living 
nearer to needed medical care. According to May's standard, the separation 
of Jodie and Mary was a paradigm case of extraordinary means, and there 
is never a duty, even though it may be permissible, to use extraordinary 
means to preserve human life. 
Unfortunately, the court turned what was permissible into what was 
obligatory. The court noted: "every instinct of the medical team has been to 
save life where it can be saved . .. [S]incere professionals could not allay a 
collective medical conscience and see children in their care die when they 
know one was capable of being saved."21 Since the operation could not take 
place against the wishes of the parents unless ordered by the court, the 
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hospital asked the court to let the doctors fulfill their vitalistic ambitions. 
Unfortunately, the court obliged them. 
The case of Jodie and Mary prompts many questions, and I have tried 
to answer only three here. Was the separation intentional killing? Was the 
separation intentional mutilation? Was the separation obligatory? The 
answer to each of these questions is the result of complex considerations, 
uncertain assumptions, and careful deliberations, but I believe the 
deceptively simple conclusion to each question is the same: No. 
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